The Question of Statehood: Will Trump’s Gaza Plan Finally Pave The Way for Palestinian Self-Governance?

By: Poema Sumrow

Photo illustration by Brendan Lynch/Getty Images

On September 29th, 2025, President Trump unveiled a 20-point peace plan known as the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict that, if adhered to by both Israel and Palestine, could possibly end the Israel-Palestine war. The first stages of the plan aim to return all Israeli and Palestinian hostages to their respective countries. While the living hostages have been exchanged, Gazan officials have struggled to recover and repatriate the bodies of Israeli hostages, citing the sheer difficulty of locating remains beneath the devastation left by Israel’s military offensive in Gaza (Stack and Boxerman 2025). The government of Israel views this as non-compliance with the stipulations, despite the fact that thousands of Palestinians have been held prisoner without trial since long before the October 7th attack. Palestinian authorities have returned dozens of captives held in Gaza, and while Israel has released some Palestinians, thousands remain behind bars (Amr et al. 2025).

Palestine has a long history of being colonized, subjugated, and oppressed by economically dominant global powers. In a land mass the size of New Jersey, Palestinians are 20 times more likely than their Israeli counterparts to be poor in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) (Amr et al. 2025). A peace agreement could not be more necessary, both for peace within Palestine and within the greater region. However, despite its presentation as a peace initiative, Trump’s Gaza plan does not center peace in the region around Palestinian statehood because it fails to address the core question of Palestinian self-determination. Moreover, the plan risks perpetuating the same diplomatic shortcomings that have long been synonymous with American diplomacy in the region. By placing Palestinian autonomy under conditional and externally monitored control, the plan frames peace as a reward for compliance rather than a right grounded in national sovereignty.

The Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, divided into twenty parts, details the gradual demilitarization of Gaza. Point nine on the plan describes that Gaza will be ruled by an apolitical committee composed of “qualified Palestinians and international experts” who will be responsible for facilitating the demilitarization, securitization, and governance of Palestine (White House 2025). The peace plan dictates that the committee, also called the Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA), will transition power to a “reformed” Palestinian Authority once Hamas has successfully been disabled within Palestine. However, as was the case with previous regional peace agreements, such as the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, this “readiness” is highly subjective, and the plan does not indicate at what point the Palestinian Authority will be adequately “reformed” to meet the conditions of the agreement.

The committee will be chaired by President Trump himself, and while the other members have not yet been disclosed, Tony Blair has been named the de facto governor-general (Motamedi 2025). Trump has maintained a close relationship with Netanyahu since his first term, and Blair, who largely supported George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq, has been called a “war criminal” by many in the Arab world (Bowen 2025). Given their past political leanings, the appointments underscore the likelihood that priorities lie not with Palestine’s pursuit of self-determination but with Israel’s political interests, suggesting delayed facilitation of Palestinian self-governance is part of a longer-term plan. Furthermore, the structure of the committee threatens to prioritize external control and political interests over genuine Palestinian self-governance upon the plan’s implementation. In September 2025, Netanyahu signed the E1 plan, which would see an Israeli settlement built in East Jerusalem to provide 3,400 homes to Israeli settlers and ultimately render future Palestinian statehood impossible (Al Jazeera 2025). Netanhayu’s engagement with a plan eliminating Palestinian statehood and, a month later, declaring that Israel is “giving peace a chance,” reeks of double standard and makes delays in implementing the plan seem purposeful (Reals 2025).

Similar to the Gaza Peace Plan, the Oslo Accords, negotiated by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat in 1993, intended for the transition of power to Palestinian authorities to happen over three distinct phases. In the early stages, Palestinian self-rule was to be extremely limited as the involved parties were focusing on the functions of the two-party state. In 1995, when the second phase was initiated, Palestinian self-rule was only guaranteed for 18% of Palestinian territory, while 60% of the land was to be handed over to full Israeli rule (Oslo I 1993). The Oslo Accords were ultimately unsuccessful because Israel maintained military rule over the entire region, making it impossible to adhere to the stipulations of the accords (Oslo II 1997). The Gaza Peace Plan, which does not immediately put Palestinian statehood at the forefront of the peace agreement and has been facilitated by yet another American president, strikes many alarming parallels with the failed peace deals of the 1990s (Najjar 2025).

Since winning his second term, Donald Trump has made it clear that he intends to win the Nobel Peace Prize, citing his self-proclaimed role in “ending eight wars” around the globe (Shankar 2025). On his visit to Israel and Egypt in October, he was quick to receive the celebration for the Gaza Peace Plan (Katulis 2025). These actions indicate that a peace deal between Palestine and Israel is viewed by the United States as a convenient opportunity for Trump to turn a decades-long struggle for peace into a means of gaining crowd support.

Despite the American public’s polarized views towards his administration, Trump’s policy holds significant sway in Israel. The actions of President Trump have captured a large portion of the Israeli public’s attention, 69% of whom highly rate the US president. It reasons that most measures he supports in regards to peace agreements will find support among the Israeli public (Wike et. al. 2025). If Trump’s goals are to achieve peace in the Middle East, he should not be using meetings with leaders of the nations in question as opportunities for his own publicity. It is imperative that any agreements that the United States helps to facilitate frame Palestinian statehood at the forefront of the agreement and do not serve to prop up the political career of a U.S. politician.

On November 17th, the UN Security Council voted to adopt the Gaza Plan, attaching to it a “scaffolding” of international legitimacy; however, the longer-term implications of the deal remain to be seen (Halbfinger 2025). As of now, there has been no motion to formalize Palestinian involvement in the restabilization campaign, as Netanyahu has refused to invite the Palestinian Authority to be involved in the International Stabilization Force for Gaza (Halbfinger 2025). While Trump has stated he will not allow Netanyahu to invade the West Bank (Rasgon et al. 2025), Netanyahu has remained firm in his opposition to Palestinian statehood even after the UN vote (Halbfinger 2025). As Hady Amr of the Brookings Institution reminds us, it is imperative to remember that “peace without equality is an illusion” (Amr et. al. 2025). Palestinian equality and statehood, one that allows for security, freedom, and economic prosperity, must be recognized in full if peace in the Middle East is finally to be established again.

The views expressed in this publication are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Rice Journal of Public Policy, its staff, or its Editorial Board.

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