Introduction
A recent terror attack by the People’s Defense Unit (YPG) on October 1st in front of Turkish government buildings in Ankara reignited and heightened tensions between the Turkish government and Kurdish militant groups (Hayatsever and Karakas, 2023). Although the attack on Ankara is the first since 2016, it represents just one of the many clashes between Turkey and the People’s Defense Unit, a Syrian branch of the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The attack was followed by Turkey attacking a U.S. base in northeastern Syria, targeting the Syrian Defence Forces (SDF). President Joe Biden took action by signing an executive order to extend the U.S. military presence in the region. The United States has perceived Turkey's recent actions, coupled with President Erdogan's anti-American rhetoric, as deliberate attempts to push the U.S. out of Syrian territory. This perspective likely accounts for Turkey's absence from Secretary of State Antony Blinken's recent Middle East tour and suggests that trust between the two NATO allies is at an “all time low” (Bayzar, 2023).
The recent attacks have drawn attention to the salient yet delicate relationship between the United States and Turkey. The People’s Defense Unit (YPG) is a U.S.-backed militant group whose main focus is establishing Kurdish regional autonomy within a decentralized Syria–a goal that threatens Turkish interests (Boyle and Perry, 2023). The United States supports the People’s Defense Units both economically and militarily as the paramilitary organization is a vital element in aiding the U.S. and its allies in the fight against the Islamic State in Syria. It is considered “the most effective force on the ground in combating ISIS” (Gürçay). Unfortunately, the United States’ support for the YPG has been a persistent cause of tensions between the U.S. and Turkey.
Since World War I, the United States has regarded its relationship with the Turkish government as particularly crucial due to its strategic economic and security interests. Maintaining a relationship with Turkey is vital to promoting regional stability in the Middle East, combatting terrorism, and ensuring global energy security. However, in 2014, President Erdogan refused to aid the U.S. in fighting ISIS, highlighting that their primary security focus was on the rise of “Kurdish nationalism and terrorism” (Cook, 2022). As a result, the U.S. turned to strengthen its diplomatic ties with the YPG in fighting against ISIS. Despite Turkey’s calls to halt all American military and financial support for the militia group, the United States continues to support the YPG to avoid a “resurgence” of ISIS and to support the Syrian Defence Force (Guyer, 2023).
The United States continues to attempt to balance its commitment to Turkey—a NATO ally—and its Kurdish YPG partners. However, the U.S.’ current policies toward both the YPG and Turkey have prevented amicable relations. This analysis will outline the complexities of the U.S.’ relationship with the Kurdish-driven militia group, the People’s Defense Unit, specifically their involvement in Syria and impact on U.S.-Turkey relations. Furthermore, several U.S. foreign policy changes will be recommended to attempt to ameliorate U.S.-Turkey relations.
Turkey and the People’s Defense Unit (YPG)
Turkey’s conflict with the People’s Defense Forces stems from a myriad of historical, political, and regional factors such as the YPG’s support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, divergent interests in Syria, and the YPG’s alignment with the United States and NATO allies, which have caused Turkey’s feelings of isolation.
First, the YPG’s desire for Kurdish autonomy has resulted in their alignment with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party–a group considered a terrorist organization by Turkey. The rise of Kurdish autonomy and nationalism greatly impacted Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy with states such as the United States, Syria, and Iraq. In terms of their domestic policy, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party have impacted national security concerns as a result of terror attacks and mass demonstrations. These actions further created concern amongst the Turkish government as they fear that the YPG not only threatens stability in Turkey but also in the Middle East at large.
Subsequently, Turkey’s complex relationship with the YPG stems from their divergent interests in Syria and the fight against the Islamic State. During the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, Turkey has aimed to prevent the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish region along its Southern border to prevent internal uprising amongst the Kurdish minority within the country, while the YPG worked alongside the U.S. to oust Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad (Gürçay). Finally, Turkey’s volatile relationship with the YPG is linked to Turkish influence in the broader Middle East. The YPG’s relationship with the United States and other Western allies in the struggle against ISIS alienated Turkey from its NATO allies due to its divergent interests–Turkey’s primary focus was combatting Kurdish militia groups (Cooks, 2022).
The YPG's alignment with the United States has heightened tensions between Turkey and the United States and altered internal NATO dynamics. As previously mentioned, the U.S. support of the YPG in the fight against ISIS caused a rift between Turkey and the U.S., two NATO allies (Sloat, 2019). One particular consequence of this tension was Turkey's intensified efforts to suppress its Kurdish diaspora, seizing an opportunity with Finland's and Sweden's NATO bids. Erdogan insisted that these countries adopt stricter measures against Kurdish "terrorists" residing abroad. In a collaborative move outlined in a joint memorandum, Finland and Sweden committed to actions against alleged PKK members, including financial restrictions and extradition facilitation to Turkey. Additionally, Sweden bolstered its anti-terrorism legislation and agreed to extradite a Turkish citizen before Turkey agreed to vote for NATO accession (“Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups”, 2023). Therefore, the U.S.’ move to support the YPG led to Turkey feeling isolated on the geopolitical stage. This further encouraged Turkey to intensify its efforts to suppress its Kurdish diaspora, leveraging opportunities presented by Finland's and Sweden's NATO bids. These circumstances have caused strained relations between Turkey and the United States especially within the NATO alliance.
Next Steps and Alternative Policies
While the United States values its diplomatic relationship with Turkey, it is unlikely that the tensions between the two countries will result in a complete removal of support for the People’s Defense Unit. However, there are several alternative solutions the U.S. can adopt in order to ease tensions with Turkey and maintain a stable, diplomatic, and mutually beneficial relationship.
First, while it may seem provocative it is important to note the complex interplay of Turkish politics in relation to Kurdish self-determination. Some political scientists have argued that while the YPG may present a threat to Turkish people as a result of the numerous terror attacks committed, the militant group, and more broadly the PKK, does not pose a serious threat to Turkish sovereignty and stability (Cook, 2022). Despite his provocative rhetoric regarding the U.S.-backed Kurdish forces, President Erdogan is aware of the internal political environment and is aware of the lack of “military solution” to the conflict between the PKK and the YPG as a supporting actor. Moreover, in preparation for Turkey’s 2023 elections, Erdogan utilized Turkish nationalism and the threat of Kurdish armed forces to bolster the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) political support and ideology (Cook, 2022). Therefore, while U.S. support for the YPG may hamper U.S.-Turkish relations to an extent, it is unlikely that the political disagreement would reach a significant enough height to require sanctions or military action.
The United States can take several alternate approaches to appease Turkey in regard to their support of the People’s Defense Unit (YPG). The United States could encourage intelligence sharing in relation to security threats and terrorist activity within the region that may threaten Turkey’s national security. Collaborative efforts in regard to intelligence sharing could help foster increased trust and diplomacy between the two states after the YPG attacks on Ankara.
Additionally, the U.S. and Turkey can strengthen joint border security initiatives which would help appease Turkey’s concerns in regard to the activity and movement of Kurdish militant groups in Syria. The U.S. collaborated with Turkey in 2019 to establish a limited buffer zone in Syria along part of the Turkish border. Joint patrols and a joint operations center were established, and the U.S. requested the YPG to withdraw forces and dismantle fortifications along the border, rendering them defenseless. However, disagreements arose when Erdoğan demanded a 20 mile-deep and 300 mile-wide corridor leading to a deadlock in negotiations.
Therefore, the U.S should heighten border security initiatives which could include a wider buffer zone such as a corridor as well as training programs and capacity-building assistance such as training in border surveillance to Turkish border officials to help minimize the movement of Kurdish militia groups from Syria to Turkey. The U.S. could further bolster the development of infrastructure along the Syrian-Turkish border by constructing surveillance towers, checkpoints, and border fencing. However, while encouraging joint security initiatives may minimize tensions between the U.S. and Turkey, it may hamper the U.S.’s relationship with the YPG as it would limit their ability to move freely between Turkey and Syria. Lastly, the U.S. should rollback sanctions placed on Turkey for allegedly aiding Russia in evading sanctions by leaving supply channels and other “trading hubs” open (Pamuk and Psaledakis, 2023).
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is evident that the role of the People’s Defense Unit (YPG) in U.S.-Turkey relations is complex, with all parties having independent, and sometimes conflicting, political motivations. The YPG continues to be a security threat to Turkey as a result of their political desire for Kurdish autonomy. The United States continues to economically fund and militarily support the YPG as a result of its role in mitigating ISIS’ influence. Turkey possesses a complex perspective of the YPG’s relationship with the U.S. Thus, it is evident that the U.S.’ desire for ameliorated relations with Turkey and support of the YPG presents a dilemma that may require alternative policies with Turkey to maintain stability. Policies that may reduce tensions and facilitate improved relations between the U.S. and Turkey include intelligence sharing, strengthening Turkish-Syrian border security initiatives, and rolling back sanctions.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Rice Journal of Public Policy, its staff, or its Editorial Board.
References
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