The Case for a Revised African Growth and Opportunity Act

By: Jenna Perrone

Photo by Karen Bleier/AFP

On Sept. 30, 2025, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) expired, raising questions about what the future holds for U.S. trade relations with sub-Saharan African nations. First passed in 2000, AGOA was part of President Bill Clinton’s broader campaign to improve American economic ties with Africa. As of 2024, AGOA provided preferential trade access to 32 African nations, allowing them to export almost 7,000 types of goods, such as crude oil, clothing, and cars, to the U.S. duty-free. The Act also increased American agriculture and HIV prevention assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, and in the words of the Office of the United States Trade Representative, it is “at the core of U.S. economic policy and commercial engagement with Africa” (Ferragamo et al. 2025; “African Growth”). Despite its imperfections, the expiration of AGOA represents a significant strategic misstep. A revised Act is essential to supporting sub-Saharan African development and protecting American geopolitical and economic interests.

Originally set to expire in 2008, AGOA has been renewed four times, the most recent being in 2015, before expiring this past September. One day prior to AGOA’s expiration, White House officials announced President Donald Trump’s support for a one-year extension of the Act, but with a government shutdown also looming large in Washington at the time, AGOA was instead pushed to the back burner (“Trump Administration” 2025). According to the United Nations, the expiration of AGOA could severely impact African apparel, agriculture, and food exports, ultimately limiting opportunities for economic diversification in sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, nine African countries will now face average tariff rates of 15% or higher on trade with the U.S., including already small exporters like Lesotho, Kenya, and Madagascar (“AGOA Expiry” 2025). Kenya alone exported 470 million dollars worth of apparel to the U.S. in 2024, directly supporting over 60,000 jobs, the majority of which were filled by women (Wandera 2025). The expiration of AGOA, then, not only threatens the economies of entire nations in sub-Saharan Africa, but also the income stability of women and families in these countries.

AGOA also has significant economic and strategic advantages for the United States. In a letter to Congress dated Sept. 11, 2025, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce enumerated these benefits: AGOA benefits “thousands of American companies” through commercial partnerships; “supports U.S. interests and values” through strict eligibility requirements that mandate commitment to human rights law and eliminating corruption, among other policies; and helps to “incentivize investment decisions to deconcentrate and diversify supply chains away from China” (Murphy 2025). Reducing reliance on China has proven particularly poignant as China is on track to export over 200 billion dollars worth of goods to Africa for the first time this year (Ferragamo et al. 2025). In the face of these threats to U.S. interests, as well as more altruistic concerns for the welfare of African states, it is clear that allowing AGOA to expire without replacement is not a feasible option.

This Act is not without its controversies, though. According to U.S. policymakers, despite initially increasing, U.S.-Africa trade began to stagnate or even decline after the first decade of AGOA. According to experts at the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations, however, this underperformance can be boiled down to issues of utilization. Only 18 beneficiaries of the program implemented country-wide utilization strategies, and other issues like corruption or a lack of infrastructure have hindered AGOA’s efficacy (Ferragamo et al. 2025; Schneidman et al. 2021).

Moreover, the rigid eligibility requirements of the program are thought to create barriers to its effectiveness. In order to qualify for AGOA benefits, sub-Saharan African nations must demonstrate progress toward building market-based economies, fostering political diversity, upholding human rights, and removing barriers to U.S. trade ( “African Growth”). Countries are reviewed annually for adherence to these requirements and can have their eligibility terminated at the discretion of the U.S. President. In the past, the Central African Republic and Uganda have had their AGOA benefits suspended for human rights violations, while Gabon and Niger faced similar consequences for ongoing coups (Ferragamo et al. 2025). While such standards were originally designed to further U.S. interests and provide security for investors, they create uncertainty among African governments and firms, who must wait yearly to see if they will still receive benefits the following year (Darnal et al. 2024). Contrary to the guidelines’ purpose of holding sub-Saharan African governments accountable for human rights abuses and other similar issues, AGOA suspensions often end up unduly burdening innocent civilians by chasing jobs from the country (Kiriungi 2023). A reimagining of the Act’s implementation is evidently necessary.

In the face of legitimate concerns over AGOA’s value, I propose a renewal of the Act but with a revised implementation strategy. For the purposes of U.S. trade interests, renewing AGOA as soon as possible is necessary to limit increased reliance of African nations on Chinese trade. For African countries, a speedy renewal is also imperative to limiting the economic repercussions of its expiration. Maintaining the Act as it stands after its last renewal in 2015, however, would be doing a disservice to all parties involved. African nations have not previously been given the support needed to take full advantage of AGOA’s terms, and if the Act cannot prove its utility through increased utilization, the issue of expiration is likely to repeat itself in the near future.

I therefore propose two major changes to the application of AGOA: a modification of the annual review process and the appointment of officials to provide guidance on compliance and usage strategy to beneficiaries. The annual review process for eligibility is useful for upholding certain international laws, but it creates too much of a disruption. African nations cannot be expected to make full use of AGOA’s benefits if they must worry yearly about them being revoked. In light of this, I recommend that the review process be carried out every three years rather than annually. This revision will allow the U.S. to continue to encourage adherence to its previously designed standards, but will also allow a greater degree of continuity, ultimately benefiting African countries formerly worried about reliance on such an unreliable program.

Additionally, the appointment of officials like policy experts and economists to aid AGOA users in drafting usage strategies will benefit all countries involved. In the past, African nations have expressed uncertainty about American compliance standards, making it difficult for these governments to take complete advantage of AGOA’s terms (Darnal et al. 2024). By helping these countries to draft national usage strategies that fit their needs and economies, the program will better serve its purpose to “[promote] economic and political reform” in the region (“African Growth”). African governments will receive resources and guidance on creating sweeping economic policies and guidelines, ultimately helping to further their development.

In short, AGOA has had countless benefits for both the United States and the sub-Saharan African countries it was designed to assist. Allowing this Act to expire was a failure on the part of the U.S. government, but one that can be remedied with the swift renewal of the program alongside a revised set of guidelines that encourage more thoughtful and complete usage of AGOA’s many benefits.

The views expressed in this publication are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Rice Journal of Public Policy, its staff, or its Editorial Board.

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References

“African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).” Office of the United States Trade Representative, ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa.

“AGOA Expiry Impact on African Export Diversification.” UN Trade and Development, 1 Oct. 2025, unctad.org/news/agoa-expiry-impact-african-export-diversification.

Darnal, Aude, et al. “Revising the African Growth and Opportunity Act: Perspectives from

Africa .” Stimson Center, 23 July 2024, www.stimson.org/2024/revising-the-african-growth-and-opportunity-act-perspectives-from-africa/.

Ferragamo, Mariel, et al. “AGOA: The U.S.-Africa Trade Program.” Council on Foreign Relations, 1 Oct. 2025, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/agoa-us-africa-trade-program#chapter-title-0-3.

Kiriungi, Jewel. “AGOA Forum: Has the U.S. Trade Pact Helped Africa?” BBC News, 2 Nov. 2023, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67284812.

Murphy, John. “U.S. Chamber of Commerce Letter to Congress.” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 11 Sept. 2025, www.uschamber.com/assets/documents/240916_Hill_H.R.-4790_ESG_House.pdf.

Schneidman, Witney, et al. “How the Biden Administration Can Make AGOA More Effective.” The Brookings Institution, 15 Nov. 2021, www.brookings.edu/articles/how-the-biden-administration-can-make-agoa-more-effective/.

“Trump Administration Says It Supports 1-Year Renewal of Africa Trade Initiative.” Reuters, 29 Sept. 2025, www.reuters.com/world/africa/trump-administration-says-it-supports-1-year-renewal-africa-trade-initiative-2025-09-29/.

Wandera, Akisa. “AGOA and US-Africa Trade: Jobs in the Balance over Deal’s Uncertain Future.” BBC, 30 Sept. 2025, www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1kwrv9k4eno.