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Alec Profit
Dec 6, 2023
The AfD Surge in Germany: A Coalition Based Response
Photo by John Macdougall/AFP/Getty Images
Introduction
The rise of the Vox Party in Spain, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, the far-right FPÖ in Austria, and the November 22, 2023 shock win of Geert Wilders and his PVV party in the Netherlands demonstrate gains in support for the right-wing in Europe, a source of concern for Western democracy (Deutsche Welle, 2023). The far-right party in Germany, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), has performed well in the West German states of Hesse and Bavaria and has risen above 21% support in the past few months (Politico, 2023). Because of Germany’s mixed-member proportional representation system, the rise in support will directly lead to more AfD seats in the Bundestag through the party vote (Palese, 2018). European centrist parties need pragmatic responses to address this populist surge rather than principled defenses of unpopular policies.
At the federal level, the AfD’s rising support, from just 10% in the last election to the second largest party in Germany, allows them to form a formidable opposition to the winning coalition. This increase in popularity is cause for concern that an AfD with power in the Bundestag would lead to major security ramifications for the U.S. (Schultheis, 2021). The AfD’s foreign policy agenda includes leaving the European Union and limiting NATO’s operations to member states, policies that would severely alter European geopolitics (Goldberg, 2023). The party is hostile to the EU, advocates lifting sanctions on Russia, and supports ending aid to Ukraine while blaming “Biden’s geopolitics” for the war (Bensmann, 2023). They question climate change, oppose progressive diversity initiatives, and seek to limit immigration as much as possible. An administrative court in Cologne labeled the AfD a threat to democracy due to its extremist policies that reflect “anti-constitutional goals”, allowing the party to be placed under surveillance by the domestic intelligence agency, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) (Carbonara, 2023). They argue that Muslim immigrants hold “foreign” and “extreme” values and that because of Islam’s supposed contradiction with their interpretation of Western and German cultural values, the appropriate response is an anti-immigration agenda (Wildangel, 2020).
Immigration and Nativism
Historically, Germany has accepted large numbers of immigrants, from asylum seekers to foreign laborers. Former Prime Minister Angela Merkel’s “Wir Schaffen Das” (We can handle this) offered hope to Syrian refugees and was a policy of good faith. Critics argue that the open-door policy has allowed right-wing extremists to exploit polarization and anger over asylum policy to create support for nativist political propaganda (Marsh and Alkoussa, 2023). Germany's acceptance of millions of refugees contrasted with the policies of other EU countries. Germany was the top destination for migrants to the EU and reached record high immigration numbers in 2022 (“Deutsche Welle”, 2023). The German constitution, Grundgesetz, ensures the right to asylum for people persecuted on political grounds. It is an important foundation of post-World War II German democracy (BAMF, 2023). However, German asylum law has loopholes that allow rejected asylum-seekers to evade effective processing and deportation (AP News, 2023). In 2022, Germany failed to conduct 2 of every 3 deportations, with 23,337 out of 36,282 deportations unexecuted (Infomigrants, 2023). In this manner, mismatches between obligation to leave the country and departure have gained political significance (EMN/BAMF, 2016). Media highlighting abuse of the German asylum system has further inflamed anti-immigrant sentiment, and the AfD has positioned itself as the only party willing to address this issue (Link, 2023).
Given its aging society and low fertility rate, Germany will need to rely on immigration to maintain its status as an economic superpower. There are currently over 750,000 job vacancies in the German economy (Hockenos, 2023). The current strategy of depending on immigration of professionals from the EU has fallen short in filling those gaps. Germany is failing to bring in enough qualified workers from non-EU countries as it only accepted approximately 41,000 in 2021 (Hockenos, 2023). The German government should focus on reforming asylum policies and expanding programs to bring skilled workers from outside the EU. The AfD’s anti-immigration agenda would be unable to address this growing issue for the German economy, displaying a popular rift from AfD policy.
A Shift in Immigration Policy
The German cabinet and left-wing parties have already adopted new immigration policies in response to pressures over immigration. Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the Social Democratic Party recently gave an interview with Der Spiegel, a German news magazine, where he proclaimed that “we finally have to deport on a large scale those, who have no right to stay in Germany” (Hickmann and Kurbjuweit, 2023). The cabinet’s classification of Georgia and Moldova as safe states will make the process of rejecting asylum from those nations easier by shortening legal deadlines (Grieshaber, 2023). The three-party coalition pushed through a migration deal restructuring the EU’s asylum system with processing centers on the external borders (Sorgi and Baragazzi, 2023). On October 25, 2023, the cabinet passed new legislation making it easier to deport rejected asylum seekers, extending pre-deportation detention, and speeding up criminal deportation processes (AP News, 2023). These policies along with new temporary border checks at the Polish, Czech, and Swiss borders aimed to “fight against smuggling [of immigrants] and limit irregular migration” have emerged as a rapid response to the growing influence of AfD (Chiappa, 2023).
A Democratic Coalition: Listening to the Voters while Addressing Workforce Aging
Federal elections loom in 2025, and a continued rise of the AfD seems likely. Given Russia’s unresolved invasion of Ukraine and the upheaval in the Middle East, anti-immigrant sentiment and anger towards the government may deepen (Bröning, 2023).
To curb nativism and support for the AfD, while also tackling the demand for a foreign workforce, centrist parties should forge a coalition to address voter concerns over immigration. The most obvious example would be a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD) coalition, which would form a grand coalition since they have traditionally been the largest parties. However, these are unusual times, with the AfD polling at 5% more than the SDP. This coalition could be framed as a bulwark of strong parties with democratic values teaming up against the fascist AfD. To reach a majority, the addition of a smaller party (Green or FDP) will likely be necessary.
Uniting major parties against the AfD alone would not stop the AfD from continuing to build support by capitalizing on nativist sentiments and criticizing the coalition. Thus, forming this coalition risks driving German voters towards the AfD if they feel that their demands are not being met. A democratic coalition must be responsive to voters' concerns regarding immigration and asylum policy, while continuing to maintain the inclusive values laid out in the Grundgesetz. Immigration reform is a necessity as 44% of Germans consider it the most important issue facing the country (Chiappa, 2023). The SDP’s youth wing and traditional proponents of “Wir schaffen das” oppose what they call “mimicking” the right’s tightening of immigration rules. They are now in the minority on the left as Sahra Wagenknecht, the most prominent politician belonging to the Die Linke party, announced a new party that will be on the political right in terms of immigration (Caldwell, 2023). To combat rising support for xenophobic stances, Germany should consider a careful management of immigration flow, by including reforms to asylum and foreign investment policy.
Tightening immigration policy does not address Germany’s demand for workers. Therefore, the implementation of programs that attend to Germany’s shortage of skilled workers should be prioritized (Chazan, 2023). An example is the Skilled Immigration Act, which will be implemented in November and restructures the EU Blue Card to make work-based migration more accessible, expand included professions, and lower requirements (Bundesregierung). It also includes policies such as a new Job Search Opportunity card where legal resident permits are given for six months to find work (Chancenkarte). National policies to make Germany more attractive to foreign workers are a start, but Germany must also look outward by expanding international campaigns that market Germany’s workplace opportunity. This will help avoid situations such as the one Finance Minister Christian Lindner faced in Accra, Ghana, when in a packed auditorium zero students raised their hands when asked if they would consider working in Germany (Hockenos, 2023).
Looking forward, a democratic coalition formed against the AfD must lead effectively. This means walking a fine line by addressing voter concerns over immigration and asylum while developing policies that address Germany’s need for an educated workforce, which are known to generate broader support (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010).
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Rice Journal of Public Policy, its staff, or its Editorial Board.
EMN/BAMF – European Migration Network/Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2016): Approaches to rejected asylum seekers in Germany. Focus Study by the German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN). Working Paper 69 of the Research Centre of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.
Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael Hiscox. “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment.” American Political Science Review, vol. 104, no. 1, 2010, pp. 61–84, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990372.
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