Pakistan’s Deportations of Afghan Refugees: A Test of International Refugee Protections
- Karma Elbadawy
- 3 days ago
- 6 min read
By: Karma Elbadawy
Photo by Hussain Sadat/Human Rights Watch
Since late 2023, Pakistan has launched a sweeping campaign to expel Afghans labeled as “illegal foreigners.” What began as a crackdown on undocumented residents has expanded to mass deportations of long-settled and registered refugees. In August 2025, Reuters reported that Pakistani authorities began deporting Afghans with Proof of Registration (PoR) cards—the primary identification document recognizing registered refugees in Pakistan—despite earlier assurances that only unregistered migrants would be removed (Reuters, 2025). Additionally, the government revoked the legal status of several refugee villages, displacing thousands. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and UN human rights experts have condemned these measures as violations of international law, warning that returnees face persecution and poverty under Taliban rule (UNHCR, De-Notification Statement, 2025; OHCHR, 2025). These mass deportations represent more than a domestic policy change; they signal an erosion of international refugee protections. By collapsing distinctions between refugees, long-settled residents, and undocumented migrants, Pakistan’s actions undermine the principle of non-refoulement and signal a broader shift away from the norms that have governed regional humanitarian cooperation.
Pakistan’s 2023 Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan (IFRP) established a series of deadlines for “voluntary” departures, backed by the threat of police raids and detention. Since late 2023, around 1.4 million Afghans have returned from Pakistan under the IFRP, including tens of thousands who were deported rather than leaving voluntarily (UNHCR, Emergency Response Update, 2025). UNHCR data show that large numbers have crossed back through Balochistan’s border points, many on foot with their families and belongings (UNHCR, Emergency Response Update, 2025). At the same time, Pakistan has announced the closure of 16 refugee camps across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and Punjab, which together host around 13,000 families, more than 90,000 refugees (Dawn, 2025). Many of these families had lived in Pakistan for decades, with their children attending Pakistani schools and speaking Urdu as a first language. The camp closures and mass expulsions disrupted established livelihoods and displaced long-settled families from communities where they had lived for decades.
Pakistan’s government defends the IFRP as a national security measure, arguing that cross-border militancy, undocumented migration, and economic pressures have strained state resources and public services. These challenges are real, and states retain authority to regulate migration and address security threats. However, such pressures do not override Pakistan’s international obligation to prevent refoulement. Although Pakistan is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is still bound by the customary prohibition on returning individuals to situations of harm. UN human rights guidance stresses that these protections apply to all persons, regardless of their formal refugee status (OHCHR, 2025). UN special-procedure mandate-holders echoed this in 2025, warning that large-scale removals to Afghanistan amid ongoing rights restrictions and insecurity would breach these obligations (OHCHR, 2025).
The current deportation drive marks a sharp break from Pakistan’s historical cooperation with UNHCR. Since 2002, UNHCR has facilitated the voluntary repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees from Pakistan (UNHCR, Pakistan Country Page, 2025). Starting in 2012, these efforts have been guided by the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), agreed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran in 2012, which tied repatriation to specific conditions of safety, dignity, and sustainability (UNHCR, SSAR Framework, 2012). Participants received small cash grants, logistical support, and monitoring to ensure that their return was genuinely voluntary.
To understand why Pakistan’s current deportations violate core international protections, it is important to consider the standards that govern lawful refugee return. The hallmark of lawful return is that it must be voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable, standards reflected in UNHCR’s global policy and decades of practice. When returns are driven by deadlines, arrests, evictions, and lapses in documentation, the “voluntary” element is compromised (UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Evaluation, 2022). UNHCR’s 2015–2021 global evaluation of voluntary-repatriation programs concluded that successful returns depend on genuine choice, adequate reintegration funding, and coordination among host and origin states (UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Evaluation, 2022). Evaluations of the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR) by UNHCR and partners found that where returns were supported by reintegration assistance and improved security, particularly in early 2002–2005 operations, many Afghans remained in Afghanistan. Today’s forced returns ignore these lessons entirely: deportations are neither voluntary nor supported by reintegration resources in Afghanistan, where infrastructure and employment opportunities remain limited.
Beyond the shortcomings of the SSAR’s later years, domestic political dynamics have also driven Pakistan’s shift toward coercive policies. The country is facing a severe economic downturn and rising populist pressure to prioritize citizens over refugees. Since 2021, Pakistan’s tightening economy and cross-border security incidents have amplified domestic calls for expulsion. Analysts note that political leaders have framed deportations as both a show of authority and a diversion from governance and inflation crises (Al Jazeera, 2025). Yet targeting refugees undermines Pakistan’s international standing and risks new instability (Reuters, 2025).
The UN Human Rights Office has reminded Islamabad that the principle of non-refoulement applies irrespective of formal refugee status (OHCHR, 2025). In practice, Pakistan’s mass deportations collapse distinctions between refugees, migrants, and long-term residents, erasing decades of administrative documentation. The de-notification of refugee villages, many of which were established with UN support, has eliminated local service networks and humanitarian access (UNHCR, De-Notification Statement, 2025). The closure of these villages without relocation plans risks violating minimum international standards for eviction and return.
Beyond legality, the humanitarian impact is severe. Families separated at the border, loss of property and education, and renewed cycles of displacement in Afghanistan all illustrate how coerced return perpetuates instability rather than resolving it (UNHCR, Forced to Return, 2025; UNHCR, Emergency Response Update, 2025). In effect, Pakistan’s policy replaces a managed, internationally supported framework with unilateral enforcement that neither deters future displacement nor supports durable solutions.
Policy Recommendations
Pakistan does not face an impossible dilemma: there are policy options that uphold sovereignty while aligning with international norms. Drawing on prior SSAR experience and UNHCR guidance, three measures stand out:
Renew PoR and Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) validity for at least one year while establishing joint screening centers with UNHCR to identify individuals eligible for protection.
Suspend the closure of refugee villages until independent humanitarian assessments determine safe relocation or return options.
Re-activate the SSAR through a new agreement, sometimes dubbed SSAR II, that ties repatriation to verifiable benchmarks: security, freedom of movement, women’s education, and livelihood access in Afghanistan.
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