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Shraddha Bhatia, Rithika Iyengar, Bryson Jun
Apr 2
Lèse-majesté: How the U.S. Can Support Democracy in Thailand
Photo by Reuters
Introduction: Lèse-majesté in Thailand
Since its transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thailand has struggled with tensions between conservative monarchists and pro-democracy reformists. Lèse-majesté laws, which prohibit offenses against the sovereign power, are used extensively in Thailand to reinforce the monarchy’s power. Currently, lèse-majesté is defined by Article 112 of Thailand's criminal code which stipulates severe punishments for those who defame, insult, or threaten the monarchy, including jail terms ranging from three to fifteen years. In practice, though, these sentences can last much longer (BBC 2017; Thailand Law Library n.d.; Human Rights Watch 2021).
Lèse-majesté in 2014 and 2023
In 2014, the Thai military, led by former army chief Prayuth Chan-ocha, established the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) in a coup that ousted Thaksin Shinawatra’s populist Pheu Thai party coalition from power. While Thaksin’s government, backed by rural voters and urban working-class communities, was progressive in that it clashed with traditional establishment and military elites, it faced accusations of corruption and authoritarian tendencies, fueling anti-Thaksin protests and prompting military intervention by the NCPO (Russell 2020). Before 2014, the number of lèse-majesté convictions was relatively stable at around 10 per year (Preechasilpakul 2008). However, after the 2014 coup, the amount and length of convictions increased substantially; between 2021 and 2023 alone, more than 100 individuals were charged with lèse-majesté violations, and the longest-ever lèse-majesté charge of 43.5 years was filed in 2021 (“Thailand: Lese Majeste Verdicts” 2023; Beech 2021).
In 2023, the Move Forward Party (MFP), a progressive political party campaigning for amending Article 112, won the most seats in the House of Representatives. However, the Constitutional Court, an unelected body, ruled that the MFP’s anti-lèse-majesté efforts were unconstitutional. This month, the Thai Election Commission, also an unelected body, approved a resolution allowing the Constitutional Court to dissolve the MFP entirely (Tanakasempipat 2024). Amidst such political turmoil, the inability to freely criticize the ruling establishment has further solidified the dominance of military and monarchical authoritarianism.
US-Thai Relations and Lèse-majesté
The United States and Thailand have had diplomatic relations for 190 years, with particularly strong military and law enforcement cooperation. However, the United States has been absent in criticizing Thailand’s lèse-majesté policies, most notably because it de facto accords with the Thai government’s prioritization of “high politics” over human rights; this is clearly represented by the U.S. sustained foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign military sales to Thailand (“The United States-Thailand Relationship” n.d.). Additionally, in Southeast Asia, the recent proliferation of illiberal regimes has led to countries refraining from criticizing rights violations such as lèse-majesté occurring within neighboring countries for fear of exposing their own shortcomings. Consequently, these states maintain a collective silence, forming informal alliances to provide mutual support and safeguard their regimes against external scrutiny and criticism by countries like the U.S., a phenomenon known as the “glass ceiling” effect (Chachavalpongpun 2024). Finally, because of growing socioeconomic ties between Thailand and China, fueled by historical Sino-Thai cultural exchange, the United States risks driving Thailand into China’s arms if it engages in sudden extreme action (Chanlett-Avery and Dolven 2023). Thus, not only does the United States fuel Thailand’s lèse-majesté law through financial support, Bangkok also avoids pressure from other Southeast Asian countries to prioritize humanitarian rights over the U.S.’ strategic interests. However, considering that there has been a rise of popular protests against lèse-majesté and political opposition to the law, it is imperative for the United States to consider the question: how can the U.S. leverage its diplomatic relations with Thailand to address the lèse-majesté crisis?
Proposed Policy Change
Because of the United States’ historically ambiguous position on lèse-majesté and the entrenchment of lèse-majesté in Thai law and society, it is difficult to openly condemn lèse-majesté or issue sanctions. However, the United States should indirectly support the removal of lèse-majesté by funding grassroots and civil pro-democracy movements through foreign aid. The Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) promotes civilian journalism in Thailand with a total funding floor of $740,740 and provides funding for “Inclusive Participation and Accountability on Human Rights within ASEAN” with a total funding floor of $1,000,000. However, this is insignificant compared to other components of foreign aid to Thailand (“DRL Promoting” 2022; “DRL Enhancing” 2024). The State Department should channel funding to specifically support grassroots institutions that champion free speech and democratic elections, such as the Thai coalition for World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS) and ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights. Additionally, USAID should broaden the scope of their Human Rights and Governance funding. Instead of solely concentrating on tackling human trafficking, they should also support grassroots efforts of pro-democracy groups in order to produce tangible improvements in democratic transparency, particularly through providing funding to journalists to support free press and to support community building in civic society organizations.
Potential Drawbacks
The geopolitical ramifications of inadvertently pushing Thailand further towards China amidst efforts to promote democracy warrant careful consideration. Thailand's deepening economic ties with China, exemplified by initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and coupled with historical and cultural connections, have strengthened Thailand's relationship with China (Chanlett-Avery and Dolven 2023). Any perceived external interference in Thailand's internal affairs, especially regarding sensitive issues like their government structure, could strain relations with Western powers and drive Thailand closer to China. This could have far-reaching implications for regional geopolitics, especially with the BRI linking southern China to Southeast Asian nations, potentially altering the balance of power in Southeast Asia and impacting the strategic interests of the United States and its allies. Additionally, this policy risks straining relations with Thai royalists who currently hold significant political influence, a trend that has persisted since the end of the Thaksin era as political parties have increasingly relied on royal support to secure power. However, the policy employs a low-level and indirect method of supporting democratization, building on existing investment and aid to Thailand from the DRL and USAID, as well as aligning with current legislative stances on Thailand’s democracy like Senate Resolution 114 and House Resolution 369. Additionally, the US has robust funding to support grassroots pro-democracy organizations in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Colombia, Ethiopia, and 140 other countries (USAID n.d.; Lawson and Epstein 2019). This policy falls well-within the U.S.’ existing toolkit, reducing the risk of unexpected geopolitical fallout.
Benefits
In Thailand, nonprofit organizations with a “democratic structure and mode of operation concerned with public welfare goals” are known as grassroots nongovernmental organizations (GNGOs), and are a vital part of the pro-democracy social framework in Thailand (Thabchumpon 1998). Not only do GNGOs promote rural political participation, they have a proven track record of effectively organizing to promote governance reforms in Thailand. The Forum of the Poor, for example, comprises a collective of GNGOs across Thailand dedicated to “active public dialogue,” which directly seeks to counter policies such as lèse-majesté. By creating forums for rural citizens throughout Northern Thailand, villagers were able to effectively put forth their demands to the Thai Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) to be included in the redrafting of the 1997 Thai Constitution, which was considered a landmark gain in terms of public representation in Thai governance (Thabchumpon 1998). Therefore, grassroots organizations have a track record of success in promoting democracy through activism against lèse-majesté. Considering that foundations (including GNGOs) need to have at least 250,000 baht of assets to be legally registered, expanding funding to these organizations would improve the breadth and depth of their advocacy (“Setting up” n.d.).
Furthermore, while this article has predominantly covered Thailand’s lèse-majesté law, it is important to note that other Southeast Asian governments such as those of Cambodia and Malaysia enforce similar laws to stifle public dissent. As these nations are members of ASEAN, policies that seek to address lèse-majesté laws in any one of these countries will have widespread implications. Given that Thailand is a major political and economic power in Southeast Asia, its democratization could promote political reform in Southeast Asia. Not only would this help to shatter the “glass ceiling” among Southeast Asian countries, creating a ripple effect of democratization, it would expand the range of operational tools the U.S. can implement in Southeast Asia, from facilitating greater U.S. partnership with ASEAN in the future to issuing more effective sanctions (Hirsch 2023).
The Path Forward
While the United States does need to be wary of exerting too much pressure on the Thai monarchy and driving Thailand to align itself with China, supporting Thai citizens’ interests while continuing U.S. military aid will not substantially disrupt the U.S.’ political relationship with Thailand (Chachavalpongpun 2024). Furthermore, the U.S. needs to balance its desire for economic and military partners in ASEAN, and its desire to promote democracy and stable regimes throughout the world. By committing to a strong pro-democracy stance, the U.S. can support movements like the fight against lèse-majesté which, in the long run, are better suited to establish political stability in Thailand by ensuring Thai citizens freedom of political expression, organization, and protest, which are central to a healthy democracy. The U.S. cannot afford to alienate Thailand, but it can also no longer ignore the country’s flagrant human rights abuses through lèse-majesté. Amending this law is crucial to allow for public discourse, peaceful democratic transitions, and to establish a resilient democracy that represents the voices of the Thai people.
The views expressed in this publication are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Rice Journal of Public Policy, its staff, or its Editorial Board.
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