Rice University's premier undergraduate journal of scholarship in domestic and international policy.
Shalin Mehta
Sep 27, 2022
Don't Gamble on the Gulf
The Russia-Ukraine War and America’s Continuing Foreign Policy Dilemma in the Middle East
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has undoubtedly challenged the international system of laws and norms, and no region of the world has been unaffected by the conflict. The Middle East is no exception as oil prices, grain imports and strategic alliances have all been impacted by the conflict. However, the region is soon to be affected in another way. As the war rages on, the ability of the Russian industrial base to continue selling arms to the world has been called into question, leading many experts to predict a significant drop in Russian arms exports to the Middle East in the coming months (Kavanagh and Wehrey 2022). This will have second order consequences for the U.S., as Gulf nations may turn to the U.S. to replace Russian weaponry, giving rise to a long-standing dilemma of US foreign policy in the Middle East.
This reduction is largely due to stringent international sanctions and export controls, coordinated by over 30 nations, that have cut off Russian supply chains, forcing them to allocate industrial capacity to the war effort rather than to foreign arms sales. Indeed, Russia has been found diverting parts including semiconductors from the production of refrigerators and other appliances to be used in the manufacture of military equipment (Shagina 2022). Even more, a September U.S. intelligence report found that Russia has inked an arms deal with North Korea, including millions of dollars worth of ammunition and artillery, which is indicative of their growing desperation with the Ukraine War and the failure of their industrial base (Kim and Tong-Hyung 2022). Regardless, the expected decline in sales is extremely significant as 16% of all arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa come from Russia (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). While this may seem like something to welcome from the U.S. perspective, the emerging arms void in an arms hungry region once again brings up a key dilemma of the United States’ role and alliances in the Middle East: should we continue to arm Gulf autocracies?
For years, the United States has turned a blind eye to the ideological differences with its Gulf partners, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), choosing instead to sell arms with disregard for how these countries use them. The humanitarian disaster in Yemen is a prime example of this. However, proponents of continuing arms sales argue that they are needed to hedge against multipolarity due to growing Russian and Chinese influence and for a number of U.S. policy priorities, including protecting allies against Iran, rewarding allies for making peace with Israel (or incentivizing them to), and protecting oil interests in the region (Kavanagh and Wehrey 2022). However, these arguments are largely misguided, and the Biden Administration should refrain from adding reduced Russian sales to this list.
Multipolarity in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf is largely inevitable regardless of arms sales. Past administrations have demonstrated a disengagement from the Middle East that has led Arab states to seek alternative relationships. President Barack Obama declined to enforce the so-called “red line” in relation to the al-Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in Syria. The Trump administration took a similar course of action, or rather, a lack thereof, in response to the 2019 attacks on Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities, signaling a withdrawal from a direct security relationship with Gulf states (Panikoff 2022). Additionally, the Obama Administration’s signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, and the Biden Administration’s attempts to revive it, further alienated Gulf allies, with one Saudi commentator noting that he viewed the deal as “the breakup of a 70-year marriage” (Mazzucco and Alexander 2022; Chulov 2022). Finally, President Joe Biden’s lack of action after Houthi rebel drone strikes in the UAE in January further signaled the declining security guarantee to the Gulf nation (Chulov 2022). Over the past several years, Gulf states have responded to these developments by drawing closer to U.S. adversaries. In 2018, the UAE signed the Russia-UAE Declaration of Strategic Partnership, the first agreement of this type between Russia and a Gulf nation, while Saudi Arabia agreed that the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would cooperate with Russia on oil pricing (Katz 2018). Additionally, China has made inroads in the region through investment in trade, energy and infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (Mezran and Talbot 2022). While the coming decline in Russian arms sales to the region may partially limit Russian influence, multipolarity in the long term is inevitable, and the United States must come to terms with this.
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that arms sales do not buy pro-U.S. policies. A 2011 study found that United States “military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of the recipient state.” In fact, the study concluded that increasing levels of military aid actually reduces cooperative foreign policy behavior by emboldening recipient states (Sullivan et al. 2011). Indeed, in August, the Biden Administration approved the sale of billions of dollars worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, but despite this, the Saudis signed a deal with Moscow the following month that would reduce OPEC’s oil output in order to raise global oil prices. This is entirely contrary to U.S. interests as since the start of the Ukraine War, the United States has tried to persuade Gulf states to raise oil output in order to lower prices (Hansler 2022; Krauss 2022).
If analysts are correct and Russian arms exports to the region decline, the United States should refrain from filling the void in the Gulf. Arms sales to Gulf nations have contributed to instability and violence, such as the brutal war in Yemen, and do not provide a significant benefit to the United States. Any sales that the United States continues to make must be part of a greater strategy that focuses more on political and economic reform in recipient states than alternative U.S. goals in the region. As the Russia-Ukraine war continues, the coming months may be a critical time for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East; the era of blank check arms sales in the Gulf must come to a full close, as demand for weapons is simply not reason enough for Washington to commit supply.
References
Chulov, Martin. “Biden Rebuffed as US Relations with Saudi Arabia and UAE Hit New Low.”
The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 3 Apr. 2022,
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