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Shraddha Bhatia
Nov 5
Combating Election Subversion Through Local-Level Vulnerabilities
By: Shraddha Bhatia
Photo by Lincoln Agnew /Brennan Center of Justice
As the next U.S. election approaches, the threat of foreign influence from Russia, Iran, and China has resurfaced, each with unique strategies to exploit divisions in society and disrupt democratic norms. The U.S. Intelligence Community has flagged Russia as the most active threat, using disinformation campaigns and media outlets to sway voter opinion and weaken U.S. foreign policy stances (U.S. Department of State 2024). Meanwhile, Iran's cyber operations and China’s focus on down-ballot races reveal a broader pattern of external actors attempting to reduce public confidence in U.S. elections (U.S. Department of State 2024). These ongoing threats are imperative to understanding the urgency of addressing election subversion to protect the democratic process.
Election subversion refers to any efforts to corrupt the democratic process by preventing the true winner of an election from taking office, a tactic that serves as part of a broader strategy to consolidate power and eventually lead to a more authoritarian regime. This issue gained prominence following the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections, where attempts to overturn the results highlighted vulnerabilities in the electoral system. Unlike voter suppression, which focuses on making it difficult for voters to cast ballots, election subversion directly targets the integrity of the vote counting and certification process. Both, however, have the ability to undermine public trust in democratic institutions (Homer and Marsden 2023).
Recent events have exposed vulnerabilities in the U.S. electoral system. The 2016 U.S. presidential election marked a turning point, as federal indictments revealed that Russian military intelligence officers interfered by hacking into systems and releasing stolen documents to influence the outcome of the election (FBI 2018). This incident highlighted the susceptibility of U.S. elections to foreign meddling and set off ongoing concerns about the integrity of democratic processes. Unfortunately, political fearmongering and claims of foreign interference have only led to more distrust in voting procedures. States like Georgia, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Nevada have been particularly susceptible to subversion due to outdated protocols and partisan interference (Waldman 2023). In response to threats posed by foreign interference, the U.S. declared a national emergency in 2018, a measure that continues to be relevant and has been extended as new risks emerge, particularly with the upcoming presidential election in 2024 (Biden Jr. 2024).
Thus, I propose that the U.S. standardize voting methods across counties and upgrade voter technology in order to counter election subversion. Standardization would reduce inconsistencies, streamline vote counting, and enhance security, creating a more reliable electoral process (Clapman 2023). By implementing uniform procedures and modernizing outdated systems, the U.S. can minimize vulnerabilities that harm voter confidence and provide foreign actors with the ability to infiltrate elections. Even though these changes require time and investment, they are essential steps to safeguard democracy and ensure consistent and secure voting experiences nationwide.
The decentralized nature of U.S. elections—running through over 3,000 counties—creates inconsistencies and security vulnerabilities in the electoral process. Some have argued that decentralization can lead to greater election security through the prevention of large-scale fraud, as manipulating results would require the coordination of multiple counties, including people from both political parties (Huangpu 2024). While this may be true in some cases, it is also important to acknowledge that decentralization allows for a higher risk of voter suppression and unequal access to voting resources. In the current decentralized system, states are responsible for controlling voting, but each county is responsible for administering and funding their own elections, managing polling places, and coordinating poll workers, leading to a patchwork of systems that vary widely in terms of security and efficiency (National Association of Counties 2018). County officials oversee critical aspects of election management, including the allocation of voting machines and maintaining the integrity of the voting process. Due to the lack of standardization, almost 20% of voters live in states passing “restrictive” laws, or laws primarily passed to limit voter access to the ballot, especially in marginalized communities (Movement Advancement Project 2024). One example of this is the 2015 Shelby County decision, in which the Supreme Court stated that the Voting Rights Act was out of date and therefore unconstitutionally violating federalism despite the Act’s reapproval by Congress 6 weeks prior. The Supreme Court’s decision weakened the ability of states to enforce the federal Voting Rights Act by ending federal preclearance requirements and impairing the ability to dispute racially discriminatory practices. As a result, vulnerable populations, particularly racial minorities, have been further exposed to unfair voting procedures in 42 states lacking their own voting rights laws (Movement Advancement Project 2024). Another issue is that there is no federal law in place against the possession of guns at polling locations. By not accounting for gun violence, the federal government fails to acknowledge possibilities of violent intimidation or harm of voters, poll workers, and election officials through the use of guns. While some states have managed to place full or partial bans on the use of guns, 36% of eligible voters are not covered by either, making it possible for votes to be swayed in some counties even without direct violence (Movement Advancement Project 2024).
Perhaps the most restrictive law is the banning of private funding for election administrations, which creates significant gaps in resources across counties. Private funding was extensively used during the 2020 election cycle, when philanthropists realized that certain election offices had greater needs for funding than what they were receiving from public funding. Over 2,500 offices relied on these private grants to hire more staff, train election officials, and purchase high quality equipment. Since then, 26 states have chosen to ban private funding, affecting 55% of all eligible voters and inhibiting counties from investing in conducting safe elections (Movement Advancement Project 2024). While it can be argued that private funding can lead to undue influence from corporations and organizations in elections, as wealthier entities may leverage financial contributions to sway electoral outcomes or gain access to policymakers, it is essential to recognize that the absence of such funding can severely hinder election administration and create disparities in resources across counties.
Along with these structural vulnerabilities and restrictive laws, the rise of election denialism and disinformation has further contributed to federal and local efforts to question electoral legitimacy. Since 2020, election denialism has surged, with many presidential and local candidates casting doubt on election results and attempting to subvert future elections. Denialism has infiltrated various levels of government, as individuals with influence over elections could manipulate security, compromise ballot machines, or conduct fraudulent audits (Homer and Marsden 2023). In Coffee County, Georgia, an attempt to prove that the election outcome was fraudulent led to a group unlawfully accessing and copying sensitive election data with assistance from the elections supervisor (Fowler 2023). Widespread misinformation has also driven voter intimidation, resulting in threats against voters and election workers, thereby weakening the administration of elections (Homer and Marsden 2023). Disinformation has further fueled doubts, spreading false claims about election fraud and eroding public trust in the electoral system. In 2022, a study by the Pew Research Center found that 48% of eligible voters expressed confidence that the 2022 elections would only be administered “somewhat well” while 29% of voters expressed that they were either “not” or “not at all” confident the elections would be administered well (Pew Research Center 2022). Finally, legislative subversion, often seen through state laws that create chaos or delay in election results, has also contributed to the potential for undemocratic outcomes. Voter suppression continues to disenfranchise large voter segments, especially through measures like felony disenfranchisement that disproportionately affect marginalized communities. These tactics collectively threaten the democratic process by altering the rules to favor specific outcomes rather than genuinely reflecting voter preferences (Homer and Marsden 2023).
Standardizing voting methods across counties could address several of the aforementioned issues affecting the U.S. electoral system. By implementing uniform procedures and extending certain state-wide laws federally, the risk of voter suppression and ballot rejection can be mitigated. For instance, standardizing regulations to limit the grounds for ballot rejection and ensuring procedural protections for curing defective ballots can prevent the exclusion of valid votes. Such an approach would reduce the likelihood of litigation that seeks to undermine election results based on technicalities, as seen in cases like Trump v. Biden (2020) and Weidner v. Racine (2020) (Clapman 2023). Moreover, consistent standards in terms of open carrying at polling locations and funding allocation to counties would help combat election subversion by reducing opportunities for manipulation. Clear guidelines for counting ballots and extending deadlines for receiving mail-in ballots would ensure that all votes are counted fairly and accurately, regardless of minor technical errors or delays. Uniformity could make the system more resilient against disinformation and intimidation tactics by providing a transparent and reliable voting process (Clapman 2023).
Another system lacking uniformity and upkeep is voting machines, as approximately 24 states use voting machines that are more than a decade old, and many of these are no longer manufactured, making maintenance and repair difficult (Brennan Center 2022). Currently, the two main types of voting machines are optical scan devices and Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines. Optical scan technology, used by approximately 60% of counties, involves scanning paper ballots, either at the polling place or centrally, to tabulate votes. This method ensures an individual, unique vote for each person that can be audited and verified. On the other hand, DRE machines, utilized by 40% of counties, allow voters to make selections through a touch screen or digital interface, with results stored electronically. Unfortunately, this can lead to the lack of a paper trail, leaving election officials to rely on the electronic data to ensure voter’s choices are accurate and making it easier for foreign actors to manipulate records. Some DRE machines include a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), which provides a paper record of each vote, aiding in post-election audits and recounts (National Association of Counties 2018). However, many jurisdictions still rely on outdated technology, including DRE systems that lack VVPAT, which can compromise the integrity of the voting process. Replacing old equipment with updated systems like optical scanners and VVPAT-enabled DREs is essential. Newer technologies not only reduce the risk of technical failures and errors, but also bolster public confidence in the electoral system by ensuring transparency and accuracy. In fact, by implementing VVPAT-enabled DREs, election officials can compare electronic results with physical, verifiable ballots, ensuring that voter choices are accurately reflected and reducing the risk of undetected foreign tampering (Gillmor 2017). Federal and state investments in modernizing voting equipment and implementing rigorous security measures are vital steps towards safeguarding elections and maintaining voter trust (National Association of Counties 2018).
Unfortunately, this is an imperfect solution as there are still drawbacks to the newer technologies. DRE machines with VVPAT can still face issues such as malfunctioning touch screens, which can lead to incorrect vote recording and erode public trust. Optical scan systems, while better than outdated DREs, can be costly to maintain and require regular updates to avoid obsolescence. Additionally, transitioning to new technologies involves financial investment, which can strain state and local budgets. In fact, the cost of replacing aging equipment is significant, with estimates of up to $1.8 billion needed over the next decade (Brennan Center 2022). These challenges, combined with the need for ongoing training and maintenance, may impact the effective implementation of newer systems and could pose difficulties for jurisdictions with limited resources. Despite these flaws, investing in new technology would improve current voting processes as recounting votes is timely and expensive, leading to greater reliability through a guaranteed paper trail and individual votes accounted for through unique optical scanning.
By upgrading outdated systems and streamlining processes, the U.S. can better protect its electoral infrastructure from vulnerabilities that foreign actors might exploit. Enhanced technology will not only improve the accuracy and security of vote counting but also reduce the impact of potential foreign interference. Globally, such improvements will set a precedent for how democratic nations can fortify their elections against external threats, promoting greater confidence in electoral integrity worldwide and encouraging other nations to adopt similar measures to safeguard their democratic processes.
The views expressed in this publication are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Rice Journal of Public Policy, its staff, or its Editorial Board.
References
Biden Jr., Joseph. “Notice on the Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Foreign Interference in or Undermining Public Confidence in United States Elections.” The White House, The White House, 9 Sept. 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing room/presidential-actions/2024/09/09/press-release-notice-on-the-continuation-of-the national-emergency-with-respect-to-foreign-interference-in-or-undermining-public.
Clapman, Alice. “How States Can Prevent Election Subversion in 2024 and Beyond.” Brennan Center for Justice, NYU Law, 7 Sept. 2023, www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy solutions/how-states-can-prevent-election-subversion-2024-and-beyond.
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