Introduction
The U.S. military-industrial complex (MIC) refers to the nation’s armed forces and the industries that contribute to its prominence in American politics and society; more specifically, the MIC advocates for increased military spending in order to further its sphere of influence. (Bacevich, 2007). The MIC’s political leverage has historically escalated violence rather than resolved it (Forcada and Lázaro, 2020). More specifically, the influence of the MIC in the Israel-Hamas war declared earlier this month threatens global security due to its interest in the continuation of conflict. De-escalation of this violence necessitates the abatement of the defense industry’s influence.
While a thriving defense sector in the United States rewards private industries, it is detrimental to the national economy in the long run. The argument for the military-industrial complex encompasses the union of multiple industries, thus facilitating a more efficient economy focused on holistic efforts towards advancement (Burns, 1969; Singer, 2001; Busari et al., 2017). The long term economic implications of the MIC, however, raise concern regarding its consequences. In fiscal year 2022, military spending was approximately $766 billion whereas other infrastructure budgets such as education (~$102 billion) and healthcare (~$132 billion) received significantly less funding (Budget Basics: National Defense, 2023; US Department of Education, 2021; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2022). Prioritizing investment in defense detracts from other essential services, thus compromising future generations’ quality of life. Hence, the long-term macroeconomic implications of an influential defense industry raises doubt as to the propriety of its short-term benefits.
Political and Economic Interest of the Defense Industry in the Israel-Hamas War
The defense industry’s acquisition of power and multinational influence is both lucrative and geopolitically enabling. In his remarks at the onset of the Israel-Hamas War earlier this month, President Joe Biden called for Israel’s “swift, decisive, and overwhelming” response to the Hamas attacks and promised “additional military assistance, including ammunition and interceptors” to aid this effort (The White House, 2023). Though President Biden did not specify the details of the additional military aid, his promise to Israel is indicative of larger economic interests at play. Currently, the United States supplies F-15 and F-16 fighter jets–manufactured by Lockheed Martin–to Israel, which are being used in air raids against Gaza (Bitzinger, 1994; Hartung, 2012). For private organizations like Lockheed Martin, war means profit. Consequently, the military-industrial complex becomes a self-sustaining cycle, with conflict leading to economic gain, which in turn motivates involvement in and exacerbation of further hostility. Furthermore, Caverley’s analysis of American defense economics suggests that “modern weapons' complexity and economies of scale tend to produce monopolies” (Caverley, 2007). The absorption of financial and technological resources by the MIC allows them to control the means of production for their own output, thus giving them full control over their prices and profits (Foster and McChesney, 2014). These monopolies facilitate the MIC’s undisputed economic gain from conflict-ridden regions, thus bolstering its capacity to promote hostility. Additionally, power over international markets grants political influence to these corporations who sway overseas economic policy by virtue of their stake in the economic climate of foreign nations (Byrne, 2010). The explicit and implicit benefits of the Israeli occupation to private corporations indicates their interest in continuing violence in unstable regions such as the Gaza Strip.
In addition, the American military-industrial complex wields decisive power over the country's involvement in foreign conflicts. Hundreds of former government officials are hired by prominent defense companies as lobbyists (Warren, 2023). By doing so, these corporations gain political connections with policymakers who are directly influencing international military action. In one instance, Senator Jon Tester–Head of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee–received $160,000 from representatives of the defense industry while drafting an $858 billion military package which, due to inflation, would not be sufficient for Lockheed Martin’s production goals (Groves, 2023). During this time, Lockheed Martin contributed $50,000 to Senator Tester’s campaign, after which the subcommittee approved an extra $1.4 billion in the defense budget. Similarly, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a pro-Israel neoconservative lobbyist organization, successfully achieved a $15-20 billion increase in the U.S. Defense budget (Ufheil-Somers, 2007). The large sums of money contributed to shaping political campaigns demonstrates the MIC’s keen interest in maintaining the status quo in international conflict. The political influence accorded to the military-industrial complex furthers the United States’ prioritization of foreign war efforts.
The Way Forward
In order to restrict the country’s interest in the continuation of war, it is necessary to constrain the influence of the MIC on political representatives and institutions. A major abettor of this power is the financial relationship between the MIC and the legislative branch. It is first important to limit the amount of money that can be donated by defense contractors to politicians. This would greatly diminish the lobbying power of the MIC, thus allowing for a more objective determination of the United States’ interest in the region rather than that of the private defense industry (Briffault, 2018). In addition, conflict of interest regulations would establish a certain period of time during which individuals are unable to move between government jobs and the private industry. This solution would hinder any insider information brought by former government officials, since their knowledge would be outdated by the time they could join defense contracting agencies, thus severing the direct connection between government and private industry (Scales and Spitz, 2002).
In terms of diplomacy, both the One-State (a unified nation under one government) and Two-State (an agreement on sovereign territory for both Israel and Palestine) seem implausible due to both sides’ disinclination to engage in dialogue with the other. Furthermore, these approaches have relied on the defense industry which abets the MIC’s leverage in the conflict. Attempts to find other diplomatic solutions have led experts to the possibility of network diplomacy, a strategy in which non-state actors and academics come together to change the political and strategic solutions to the conflict (Morotsov, 2022). Contrary to the MIC, which profits from violence, NGOs such as the Alliance for Middle East Peace work to mitigate it (Farouk, 2019). Morotsov argues that if multiple NGOs collaborate, they can establish a sphere of influence in the region that benefits peace (Morotsov, 2022). Furthermore, deriving human capital from academia aids strategy development, since these individuals have devoted their careers to researching policy solutions to the ongoing conflict. Increasing non-government entities’ prerogative on policy regarding the Israel-Palestine Conflict would reduce opportunities for the MIC to influence diplomatic tactics and thus would limit interest in the continuation of the conflict.
Conclusion
Due to the U.S. military-industrial complex’s continued interest in the exacerbation of war, it is imperative that measures be taken by policymakers and diplomatic actors to reduce the role of the MIC and ease the brutality occurring in and around the Gaza Strip. Current efforts have failed to promote dialogue between Israel and Palestine, even before the October 7th attack by Hamas. The direct involvement of the MIC in shaping US foreign policy in the Middle East contributes to the dispute since the industry profits from arms sales to Israel. A two-pronged policy reform approach in domestic and foreign affairs offers hope for a stronger movement towards peace. First, limiting the financial and information exchanges between the government and private defense industry would limit the MIC’s impact on the creation of US policy, and a shift to prioritizing the efforts of scholars and NGOs would emphasize the goal of peace rather than profit. While the MIC is one of many factors contributing to the violence in the region, these developments could have broad implications on global security by putting the power to make change in the hands of agents for nonviolence rather than a government beholden to the financial interests of the MIC.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Rice Journal of Public Policy, its staff, or its Editorial Board.
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