A Moral Obligation: The Legacy of the Rwandan Genocide and the Case for Sanctions Against Rwanda

By: Jenna Perrone

Photo by Ben Curtis/ AP

Introduction

April 6, 1994 dawned a hopeful day for the people of Rwanda: the bloody civil war that had been raging since October 1990 between Hutu forces and the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) seemed on the brink of ending. These hopes were dashed when President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down over Kigali that night, prompting Hutus to “seek revenge” against the Tutsi for supposedly orchestrating the assassination. So began the Rwandan Genocide, a period of about 100 days in the summer of 1994 during which more than 800,000 Tutsis, Twa, and moderate Hutus were killed before the RPF manged to subdue the perpetrators with little international assistance (Alluri 13-15).

The United States fell short in its response to the Rwandan Genocide, a failure readily admitted by President Bill Clinton after he told genocide survivors that the entire world should “bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy.” Clinton went on to claim, “We owe to those who died…our every effort to increase our vigilance and strengthen our stand against those who would commit such atrocities in the future” (Clinton).  The U.S. has failed to uphold such a promise, specifically in regards to violence at the Rwanda-DRC border by the March 23 Movement (M23), which has been financially and militarily supported by the nation of Rwanda as a result of lingering ethnic tensions from the Rwandan Genocide (Usanov et al. 40). Sanctions against Rwanda are a valuable first step in incentivizing the Rwandan government to cut its support of the March 23 Movement. 

The Beginnings of M23

Since 1994, the Rwandan government has been haunted by the fear of Hutu genocide perpetrators reemerging after having fled to the DRC. As a result, Rwanda has made a habit of supporting armed Tutsi groups within the DRC that promise to subdue these threats, beginning with the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) in 2006. Later, in 2009, Rwanda pressured the CNDP into disarming and signing a peace agreement with the DRC that would integrate them into the Congolese army (Usanov et al. 39-40). In April 2012, relations between Rwanda and the DRC worsened again when a faction of former CNDP soldiers formed the March 23 Movement. Named after the date on which the DRC and CNDP signed the 2009 agreement, M23 claimed the DRC had not honored its terms. (Usanov et al. 40). 

Although Rwanda has denied its continued support of M23, the U.S. and UN remain convinced of this accusation. In August 2022, UN experts claimed to possess “solid evidence” that the Rwandan government was providing supplies and military assistance to M23 (“UN Experts”). In July 2024, a UN representative from the U.S. claimed, “Rwanda's military interventions and operations in North Kivu have extended beyond mere support for M23 operations to direct and decisive involvement.” Representatives from France, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the DRC also accused Rwanda of supporting M23 (“Military Group’s Expansion”). Rwanda has further admitted to stationing troops and missile systems in the eastern DRC (“What’s Happening”). In a February 2024 statement, the U.S. State Department urged the Rwandan government to remove troops and supplies while further describing M23 as a “Rwanda-backed” militia (“Rwanda Rejects”). 

M23 remains active on the Rwanda-DRC border, and as of July 2024 has displaced 7.3 million people (“Military Group’s Expansion”). UN peacekeepers have been present in the region since 1999 but have largely failed to promote stability. Following pressure from the Congolese government, the nearly 6,000 peacekeepers currently in the DRC are set to withdraw by the end of the year (“Washington Diverts”). 

The Case for Sanctions

At a meeting of the UN General Assembly on September 25, 2024, DRC President Felix Tshisekedi called for sanctions against Rwanda, whom he accused  of committing “a major violation of [Congolese] national sovereignty” through its support of M23. Tshisekedi further claimed that the actions of M23 have made the DRC unstable and worsened conflicts in all of East Africa (“DRC Leader”). Tshisekedi’s concerns about the state of the DRC show striking similarities to the very conflicts President Clinton pledged the U.S. would prevent in his 1998 speech to Rwandan Genocide survivors. The U.S. has a responsibility to intercede and uphold the promises President Clinton made to “move more quickly to minimize the horror” of future events like the Rwandan Genocide (Clinton). 

Given the UN peacekeepers’ failure to adequately address the Rwanda-DRC conflict, it is the responsibility of the U.S. to devise a new plan to deescalate the region. Sanctions will prove to be a useful tool in holding Rwanda accountable for its support of M23. According to the U.S. State Department, Rwanda relies heavily on American trade and humanitarian aid (“US Relations”). Moreover, there is a precedent for sanctions to target M23. In October 2013, the U.S. cut its military aid to Rwanda due to their support of M23, who was rumored to have been using child soldiers at the time (“US Sanctions Rwanda”). In the summer of 2023, the EU and the U.S. imposed targeted sanctions on high ranking members of the Rwandan military, as well as leaders of M23 and other rebel groups, for their contributions to instability in the DRC. Although these sanctions have been successful in negatively impacting the individuals they were meant to target, Human Rights Watch argues they were not widespread enough to affect long term change (“US Sanctions Rights”). 

American assistance to Rwanda in fiscal year 2021 totaled nearly $150 million. Much of this money goes towards Rwandan healthcare, in which the U.S. government is the largest investor. Sanctioning Rwanda is difficult because Rwandan citizens, especially those battling HIV, rely heavily on U.S. investments in healthcare to receive life-saving treatment. The U.S. does invest smaller amounts in other sectors of Rwandan society, such as the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF), which should be the first target for aid reduction (“US Relations”).

Sanctions do have the potential to negatively impact innocent citizens of Rwanda, especially in the healthcare sector, but are necessary nonetheless. As of April 2023, over 40% of Rwanda’s national budget came from foreign aid (“Could FDI”). This places Rwanda and its citizens in an incredibly vulnerable situation because foreign aid to Africa as a whole has been declining since 2018 (“Aid to Africa”). Sanctions will allow the U.S. to cut its support of the RDF, which has been directly involved in military operations in the DRC, while also providing an incentive for Rwanda to begin relying less on foreign aid in all sectors (“What’s Happening”). Ultimately, this will make for a more stable economic condition for the people of Rwanda because they will no longer need to rely on fickle foreign investors. 

Conclusion

The United States will never be able to undo the series of unfortunate choices that allowed thousands of Rwandans to be slaughtered in 1994 with little international intervention. It can and should, however, help to shape the future of this region through a targeted approach to M23 violence on the Rwanda-DRC border. Sanctions against Rwanda, which is alleged to have supported M23, will prove the most realistic means of intervention given Rwanda’s reliance on U.S. aid and the previous failures of UN peacekeepers. Wounds from the Rwandan Genocide have been allowed to fester along this border for far too long, and it is high time they are treated. Although sanctions alone may not be sufficient in resolving the issue of M23, they are a promising first step in holding the necessary parties accountable.

The views expressed in this publication are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Rice Journal of Public Policy, its staff, or its Editorial Board.

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